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SOME PRACTICAL OBSTACLES IN
MODIFYING GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE
TO MEET METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS
Lennox L. Moak't
THE "METROPOLITAN

PROBLEM"

There is perhaps no governmental subject about which there is
so much currently written, so much concern, and so little understanding as the "metropolitan problem." Numerous efforts have been made
to define it. Among the better ones, we find some fine phrases which
together encompass the total gamut of human existence. I doubt that
we can afford so all-inclusive a definition.
For purposes of this paper, I use the term metropolitan problems
to mean:
Those problems of governmental significance occurring in two
or more legally coordinate governmental jurisdictions at the
local level which require joint or cooperative action for their most
rational solution. Such jurisdictions must be situated in an area
in which there is a primary orientation of economic and social
activities to a common center.
It is not necessary that the problem exist in each of the jurisdictions, or even in a majority of those composing an area for it to become
metropolitan in character. Thus, ten jurisdictions out of 500 in a
metropolitan area may have a basic water supply problem. If these ten
jurisdictions are important to the metropolitan complex, and if the
solution of the problem requires either joint or cooperative action, it
qualifies as a metropolitan problem. However, most metropolitan problems encompass a much larger percentage of the jurisdictions of the
area.
Unfortunately, students working in the metropolitan field have
reached little or no agreement as to just what they are trying to remedy.
This situation arises in large measure from the lack of widespread
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scientific attack in the determination of which aspects of organization
of governmental activities require modification.
I assume that we are in search of improved methods for the performance of certain common services-both public and private. But
I also assume that we are here concerned only with those which are
performed by or significantly regulated by public agencies. Thus,
while the support of a symphony orchestra may be an important community activity which cuts across many legal jurisdictional lines, it is
not a "metropolitan" problem unless it becomes a governmental or
governmentally-sponsored enterprise. Conversely, the exercise of the
police function is metropolitan at least in some degree because of the
necessity for ,cooperation between publicly constituted law enforcing
agencies.
The objective of this paper is to discuss some of the practical problems involved in adjusting governmental structure for a more rational
performance of governmental functions in the solution of metropolitan
problems. The list of such problems is long. In fact, it is so long that
the writer cheerfully admits he has neither the patience, experience nor
competence to discuss all of them at this time. But he believes that any
discussion of problems is conditioned by at least the two following
factors:
(1). The system of values. Prerequisite to a comprehensive
discussion of practical problems would be a determination of a
system of values to be used in judging ultimate solutions. Any
such system would involve not only very tangible items such as
effectiveness, efficiency and economy in management of public
affairs but also, if one should want to become deeply involved in
philosophy, some agreement upon the very ends of human existence.
(2). Structure itself. The nature of structural arrangements
sought for a solution of metropolitan problems within themselves
carries the determinant of the degree to which certain specific problems discussed below are applicable. Obviously, a different set of
problems would be involved in achieving minor structural modifications for cooperative contracting between units for performance
of services as contrasted with any effort at a wholesale consolidation similar to that which took place in Philadelphia County in
1854.
A full paper could be developed on the value system but we must
short circuit this process here, leaving only inferences of possible elements in value system as they evolve from discussion of the problems.
Even inferences are subject to challenge as each reader doubtless has

1957] OBSTACLES IN MODIFYING GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

605

his own value system and, should he be writing this paper, he might develop the same concepts quite differently.
With respect to structure, if the consideration of metropolitan
problems is to proceed on a logical basis, we must first determine the
specific problems for which solutions are required. Secondly, we must
review, on a problem-by-problem basis, the best theoretical solution to
each problem-including the best structural arrangement. For a
single problem this theoretical solution may be relatively easy to determine. But even upon a theoretical basis, complications arise as we
attempt to reconcile and adjust a dozen or more different theoretically
most desirable structural solutions for a corresponding number of
metropolitan problems. Thus, if one of the metropolitan problems is
basic water supply for half of the area, and another is transit for twothirds partially overlapping the first, and deep-water transportation
problems involve directly only a few units, we begin to see that the
reconciliation of a variety of theoretical solutions for individual metropolitan problems is far from easy.
POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

In the course of arriving at the theoretical solutions best suited
to the problem, one must resolve the question as to whether he will
undertake to rely upon cooperative action by existing governmental
units-for example, there are several hundred within the Philadelphia
metropolitan area of eleven counties. Is the cooperative approach really
feasible in the light of the manifold considerations? The machinery for
achieving and carrying into execution a solution to any number of common problems on a cooperative basis would doubtless break down before
getting into motion. Moreover, the history of effective cooperation on
a problem by problem basis among so numerous a group of units is not
encouraging as a basis upon which to proceed.
If not on the basis of cooperation among existing units, then
other possibilities include transfer of some municipal powers to the
eleven counties and trying cooperation between a lesser number of
units on a county-unit basis.' The prognosis for success would doubtless be greater than with hundreds of units, but the lack of integrated
and legally enforceable action would still be a real impediment.
The possibility of one or more federations suggests itself and requires careful exploration. The nature of the federations and the kind
of machinery would do much to determine their usefulness in a practical
solution to common problems.
1. The author significantly omits consolidation on any area-wide basis as both
theoretically undesirable and practically unattainable.
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Among the possibilities to be explored would be that of greater reliance upon either special or general purpose authority-type organizations created through compacts between the existing jurisdictions. But
again, in order to hold the number of participants to some manageable
group, devices for consolidation of some functions at least at the county
level would be indicated as a prerequisite to negotiation of practical
compacts on a local basis.
Compact arrangements could, of course, take on a state-to-state
relationship with the states superseding their local units in the negotiations and determination of structure, powers and functions to be performed. Interstate compacts heretofore negotiated generally provide
only for representation at the state level, leaving the local interests to
shift for themselves through political or informal means to achieve any
effective degree of representation of local interests in such interstate
agencies dealing with essentially local problems.
Within the realm of structural possibilities is that of the creation
of a new level of government which would be above the county and
below the state. It could be operative within the boundaries of a single
state or on a bi- or tri-state basis under negotiated and approved interstate compacts. It could be endowed with fundamental powers in the
same manner in which townships, boroughs, cities and counties are so
endowed today. It could provide for either direct popular representation or indirect representation in its governing authority. It could be
assigned specific functions on a region-wide basis or gradually assigned
such functions as the local governmental units deemed appropriate to
transfer to it for performance.
In the matter of determining structure, a primary value to be considered is the method of maintenance of popular control at essential
points. Practical politicians may momentarily scoff at the theory of
popular control. But in the long-term view there is nothing more
fundamental in the development of American public life than the insistence and ultimate achievement by the public of popular control over
public business. Witness the fact that the Constitution of the United
States, as originally adopted, sought to, place the Senate and the Presidency beyond popular control. While it took a long time, it is clear that
today both the Senate and the Presidency are organs representing the
people directly. The people would not tolerate a system under which
the Senate could be chosen by state legislatures with consequent possibilities for an unresponsive, irresponsible and unrepresentative Senate.
Nor did they long permit the electoral college to be chosen or to function in the manner originally intended by the constitutional framers.
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In like manner, the people of Britain have converted their Parliament into an instrument of effective popular control.
Therefore, while short-term solutions, such' as inter- or intrastate authorities removed from positions of popular control, may
flourish, this writer is of the opinion that the people will devise and force
upon their elected officials the means for popular control of instrumentalities performing important public functions. Such control may
take the form of direct popular election, or it may take some other form
of political invention. But the architect of any plan for solution of
metropolitan problems upon a permanent basis is confronted with, and
I think must solve, the question of how popular control is to be made
effective.
OBSTACLES TO STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Clearly the determination of structure upon both a theoretical and
practical basis constitutes a significant problem and the solution will
not be developed by formula or without study and experimentation. In
any event, assuming that the desirable solution requires a substantial
degree of structural change, numerous problems, or obstacles, block
the road to achieving the change. Any list of those problems would
include as a minimum the following, and some would include many
more:
(1). Legal-constitutional and statutory problems, interplay
of forces in legislative bodies, and inter-state character of some
actions required.
(2). Political-theory of popular control, present pattern of
party control of local governmental units, importance of a "place
in the sun" for local political leadership in officialdom, and closeness to the people.
(3). Fiscal.
(4). The vested interest-public officials and employees,
those who profit from business arrangements, those who enjoy or
think they enjoy special tax or other privileges.
(5). Emotional-apathy, pride, fear and jealousy.
(6). Communication.
(7). Plain Cussedness.
Legal
A separate paper is included in this symposium on legal problems
in rearranging structure.2 I shall not undertake to transgress upon this
2. Miller, Metropolitan Regionalism: Legal and Constitutional Problems, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 588 (1957).
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treatment in the normal context; however, I am impelled to some re-

marks on this point.
We have succeeded in creating for the conduct of our public
business a legal structure which is so inflexible that if imposed in the
conduct of our private affairs it might well spell our sudden economic
and social death. It is highly significant in most of our activities as
citizens of a nation or state that we proceed back and forth across this
nation, across state lines, across minor civil jurisdictional lines with
little or no consciousness of their existence. Thus, except for payment
of certain state and local taxes, and conformity to certain legal formalities, if one chooses to earn his living by producing and marketing hairpins, he may organize his venture with little regard to political and
jurisdictional lines.
Likewise, a great national or international steel corporation may
with few inhibitions seek a rational organization of its activities within
national boundaries. While state and local taxes and regulations affect
a determination of where certain elements of the industry are to situate,
the corporation is virtually without legal restraint as to where to establish the various elements of its operations. Moreover, either the hairpin company or the steel company can with great flexibility adjust and
readjust its corporate structure as the management deems will best
contribute to the achievement of the objective of the respective company.
As a matter of fact, the hairpin and steel companies may merge, or either
of them may create sub6rdinate corporations as appear desirable.
Even in the operation of national transportation systems, which
are heavily regulated by various levels of government, the regional or
national character of the corporate structure makes possible the carrying out of functions across minor or major legal jurisdictional lines
with a minimum concern for such lines.
But if we take any one of the foregoing functions, particularly that
of manufacturing hairpins or steel, and consider transferring their
ownership and management from private to public control, a host of
problems immediately arises. Among the more important of these are:
(a) To what level-national, state or local-is the assignment to be
made? (b) If assigned to a local or state unit, how do we achieve the
necessary framework for cooperative or joint action with other coordinate units necessary for effective and economical performance of
the function? (c) How are charges to be apportioned? If there is a
profit or a loss who is to share? (d) What shall be the means by
which the newly acquired public function is to be controlled in order
to meet our traditional concepts of keeping governmental activities in
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a position of responsiveness and responsibility to our elected representatives-both executive and legislative?
In all of these matters, we would be confronted with a host of
legal requirements and inhibitions. Private business frequently complains, and sometimes with much justice, about restrictions upon freedom involved in the conduct of business. Yet, comparatively, they have
the freedom of an eagle in flight, while public jurisdiction must seek
some practical route through a maze of legalisms in order to come to
any kind of workable answer.
It is appropriate here to call attention only to the general breadth
of the legal structure and to mention that the entire theory of our legal
system-based upon a tradition of tradition-loads the dice heavily in
terms of maintenance of stability and, therefore, of the status quo. None
of these legal obstacles is insurmountable in the face of protracted attack, but they are legion. The fact that we can do almost nothing
within the present framework may prove beneficial in that it will help
to create the crisis conditions frequently essential to solutions of public
problems, rather than mere painless and transitory adjustments.
Political
Except for the careful student of public affairs, few persons are
able to place matters to which the word "political" is attached in even
a reasonably adequate frame of reference. Few words in our vocabulary
are more loaded and likely to bestir stereotypes than is the word "political." And unfortunately the images thus conjured range through the
widest spectroscope projection.
Despite this, the political problems are of great importance. If
we look, for example, at the five Pennsylvania counties in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, we find a host of political considerations and
conditions which help to identify the following practical political problems in achieving a solution to problems of metropolitan governmental
structure.
Party Control
One of the most obvious items is the present distribution of party
control of the formal governments operating in the area. At the state
level, the Governor is Democratic and both houses of the legislature are
controlled by the Republicans. Philadelphia City (and former county)
offices are almost all controlled by the Democrats. Majority control
at the county level in Bucks County appears to be in a state of flux;
Chester, Delaware and Montgomery Counties are all firmly Republican.
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At the borough and township level, a few units are controlled by
the Democrats, but the great majority in the four counties is in the
hands of the Republicans. Examination of votes for the entire fivecounty area in recent state and national elections shows that the two
parties-on the entire area basis-are fairly well balanced. But within
specific jurisdictions, control by one or the other party is frequently so
firm as to set up a resistance to merging in any way with larger units
because of the risks assumed of losing control-both personal and
party.
A Personal Place in the Sun
The importance of personal recognition and prestige on a local
basis is a factor frequently not understood, or under-rated, by those who
have occasion to consider political conduct.
Public office, particularly at the township and borough level, affords at least 4,000 citizens in the four Pennsylvania counties nearest
Philadelphia an opportunity for direct public service as elected public
officers-councilmen, commissioners, tax collectors, attorneys, et al.
For many of these it is a public service undertaken as public duty
with little hope or desire for recognition or reward beyond that of a
public service.
But for a large number of such office holders, the office is a matter
of personal prestige for the holder. Moreover, frequently it is both a
source of current employment and potential advancement either politically or from the viewpoint of remuneration. Those office holders,
and at least an equal number who aspire to replace those now in office,
constitute a potent group with an interest in the maintenance of the
status quo. They tend to view with suspicion any proposal for
change-whether in the broad interest of solution of metropolitan problems or in wholly local matters of more effective and efficient organization for performance of governmental functions at presently assigned
levels.
The Big, Bad City
Many smaller jurisdictions in a metropolitan region enjoy a remarkable degree of freedom from corruption in the performance of
public functions, and some of them enjoy this over long periods of
years. Conversely, the big city is almost a stereotype for corruption in
the handling of public business. It is there that the great political
machines have evolved, disintegrated, and been born again during the
past three generations. There is a strong reluctance on behalf of many
suburban communities to become involved with this stereotype of evil-
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the big city. The fact that there may be equally potent local political
machines, and sometimes equally corrupt, does not appear to lessen concern in any significant degree.
Keep Government Close to the People
Aside from the foregoing, there is both a real and specious argument that is advanced with regard to keeping government close to the
people.
On the specious side, many officials and other self-interest groups
argue that transfer of functions to larger governmental units, whether
through merger or creation of new levels or instrumentalities, has the
effect of rendering popular control impossible. Clearly, we have,
through our large cities and our state and national governments, demonstrated that size within itself does not necessarily mean that popular
control is lost when government is performed not so close to the people.
While these arguments are frequently advanced with great sincerity,
the independent observer sometimes wonders to what degree such
arguments-when advanced by public officials-are not in large
measure a smoke screen to cover up less laudable ambitions or considerations.
On the other hand, any keen, independent observer sees that public
participation in community affairs-beyond the formal balloting
stage-is perhaps deeper in the small community than in the larger
cities. Thus, there is more frequently a personal knowledge of the
strictly local developments in a medium or even large township or
borough than in a city the size of Philadelphia. Officials are known on
a personal basis to a larger percentage of the people. Teachers and
school administrators are more likely to be neighbors. Any public
problem-a sewer, bridge, firehouse or school-receives direct attention and some community participation in the planning process to a
greater degree than in the large city. For a variety of reasons schools
are frequently better in the medium size suburb than in the very small
or very large jurisdictions in the region.
Hence, he who would solve metropolitan problems is confronted
with a most practical problem in assaying the values to be derived from
keeping the government close to the people against the apparent practical necessities for performance of some functions at a different level.
Fiscal Considerations
The solution of many problems has as its base the need for
adequate moneys to finance the services. In general, the Philadelphia
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metropolitan area is one of those in the nation well able to finance its
own local and regional services. However, the older cities, particularly
the core cities, are today confronted with needs for urban renewal on a
scale so vast as to stagger the imagination. This renewal is essential
to keep these older and core areas in reasonable competition with the
newer cities and the suburban sections.
While the federal government may prove to be the primary source
of fundamental economic renewal funds, every metropolitan problem
requires money for its solution. For example, if transportation (transit
and highway) needs are to be met, new sources of financing will be required. Also, with developing fundamental water resource problems,
the means for financing their solution are not clear. Many other examples could be given of metropolitan needs for which adequate
financing must be found.
Even if the basic economy of the region is such as to permit a degree of taxation or service charges sufficient to cope with the problems,
the political and practical questions of the allocation of the benefits and
charges involved in financing are serious, continuing and never fully
or satisfactorily resolved. Means must be found for equitable assessment of costs of services to all jurisdictions benefiting.
Vested Interests
Government does not operate in a vacuum. It provides services.
It employs people. It buys goods and services in the open market. It
taxes persons-both natural and legal. It regulates activities of persons
and corporations.
In the performance of each of the foregoing kinds of activities, law
governs in part; but also, large amounts of discretion must be vested
in the public officers to whom the performance of these functions is
assigned.
In the process of exercising discretion, certain patterns are established. Joe is given a job; Jim has the garbage contract; Sam supplies
the gasoline for municipal trucks; Susie is the tax assessor; and Josephine is the tax collector; the Ajax Corporation is assessed at twentyfive per cent of market value, and the Ajar Corporation is assessed at
twenty-seven per cent, while widow Jones is assessed at twenty per

cent; and the Blue Moose Greater Hamburger Joint, Inc., manages to
get by without a few required license fees, and with a kindly health
inspector who doesn't see too much wrong with the flies in the kitchen.
Each of these persons, and many more, have something. Most of
them know what they have. Some have, or fancy that they have,
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special advantage. Each may be concerned over the disturbance of the
status quo.
Beyond the foregoing is an important fact applicable to taxpayers
generally. While one minor civil jurisdiction operates its services
economically and perhaps even frugally with consequent lesser tax
or service charges, its neighboring jurisdiction may have a higher level
of services or may operate extravagantly. In the first unit, therefore,
there is a vested interest in the maintenance of the lower rates being
paid.
Even the person who is enjoying no special privilege but just getting satisfactory service at a price satisfactory to him will want to be
convinced what benefit he is to derive from a change in things as they
are. The fact that many other sections of the region are confronted
with unsatisfactory service in a given function and that a reorganization would be for the general good is not sufficient to cause him to want
to give up, or even run the risk of sacrificing, his present satisfactory
arrangement.
Finally, therefore, all of these facets of vested interest in the status
quo must be recognized as powerful forces with which the proponent
of change must deal, and deal successfully.
Emotional Considerations
Among the emotional factors constituting problems in structural
change are the following.
Apathy
There are no adequate measures of the degree of concern which
citizens have with respect to adequate solutions of their public problems. Nor is there fully adequate understanding of the factors which
motivate one individual to a very serious concern, and another to an
occasional interest, and still another to no interest at all. These are
matters of human behavior which require very large amounts of research to be made cooperatively by the psychologists and the students
of public problems, before meaningful and helpful knowledge is available.
Of course, it is recognized that persons with direct concern have
greater interest than those with indirect concern. Thus, on the average,
parents with children in public schools have a keener interest in school
problems than do those without children. Also, people with automobiles are more concerned with the conditions of the road system than
those rare citizens who do not have them. And so on, we must explore
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through the whole gamut of governmental activities and related interest groups.
With respect to the general or specific solutions to metropolitan
problems today, it is probably a fair generalizaton to state that only
a very small percentage of the citizens are aware that such problems
are metropolitan or regional in character. They may be aware of the
problem but that does not necessarily identify it as one with which
other citizens in remote sections of the region are also concerned. Nor
does it automatically suggest that a common effort at solution upon a
regional, rather than strictly local, basis is appropriate.
Therefore, apathy, born largely out of ignorance, is a practical
problem.
Local Pride
Closely related to apathy, but in some respects its antithetical opposite, is local pride. Local pride is helpful in the organization of many
aspects of community life. Generally, it is a "plus" concept and one to
be encouraged. Yet, like nationalism on the larger scale, it can-in a
world so interdependent-become a significant obstacle to a wider approach to problems of a regional character. Local pride in the handling of what appears to be a wholly local problem can sometimes
become a blinding force, particularly when skillfully handled by the
professional. This blinding force is an important element in maintaining the status quo long after the conditions have disappeared which
made a particular action rational.
Local pride is a peculiar phenomenon. This phenomenon of our
emotional attachment to a wholly artificial area on a map, usually laid
out before our time, is difficult to explain in purely logical concepts.
Yet it is a real force which those assigned or dedicated to the solution
of public problems on a regional basis must be willing and able to understand, to accept, and to provide for retention of its plus values in
structural patterns evolved.
Jealousy
Jealousy, both individual and collective, may be a factor in modifying structural arrangements. The community having striven successfully to meet a particular problem, may have little tolerance for a
solution which will call upon it to share the benefits derived from the
application of its resources with neighboring communities.
Fear
Finally, there is fear-fear of the big city, fear of government,
fear of bigness itself, fear of the development of new patterns for the
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performance of services that may run to dictatorship or national control,
or may result in diminution of quality of service already found satisfactory.
Communication
Metropolitan areas are of course composed of people. It is these
people who in the long run determine-through either positive or negative action-the course of solutions of public problems.
In a large metropolitan area, the problem of communication becomes extremely difficult. Most persons in such an area are obliged to
rely upon a favorite metropolitan newspaper, a favorite radio or television station and one or two other principal communication devices
for their knowledge of public- problems. In such an area, it is only
natural that the large mass media concentrate upon matters of greatest
interest to the greatest number. Thus, in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, the lineage and radio time devoted to the problems of the
city of Philadelphia, with about half the metropolitan area's population, far exceeds the combined lineage and time devoted to that of any
one of the suburban areas, or perhaps indeed of all of them combined.
Residents of suburbia are serviced by certain local newspapers
and occasionally radio stations or programs focused directly upon the
local problems. Thus, the resident of the core city has little opportunity
to become acquainted in depth with the problems of the region, even
though he may become cognizant of the problems within the city. The
resident of the suburb may become aware of the problems of the core
city and of his own smaller community, but again may be ignorant of
the broader implications of what he knows as it applies to the entire
area.

With no thought of trying to sell people a "bill of goods," one of
the very practical problems confronted by one who wishes to modify
governmental structure in solution of metropolitan problems is that of
effective and full communication to those citizens in the region with
whom determination of the outcome will, in fact, lie-either through
positive or negative action.
Plain Cussedness
Any catalogue of obstacles that must be overcome that omits
plain cussedness is incomplete. The fact that the Democrats propose a
solution may itself be sufficient for the Republicans to oppose the solution. The fact that one township is favorable to a proposal is frequently
enough to insure the opposition of its neighbor. If one individual or
organization proposes a specific thing, another individual or organiza-
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tion seems somehow to feel called upon to oppose it. This is a reality,
not an illusion, and must be dealt with as such.
THE ODDS AND THE ALTERNATIVE

One might conclude after reading the foregoing that the odds are
so great as to make progress toward solution impossible. I do not
think so.
The alternative to progress is stagnation, and stagnation is a prelude to ruin. Clearly our metropolitan problems can never be fully
or finally "solved." We may allow conditions to continue to deteriorate until a crisis point is reached. Or we may commence now to
develop and secure acceptance of answers likely to avoid such crisis.
Between where we are and where we may hope to go lies a kind
of intensive research along a number of lines that has perhaps never
been accomplished in American government. Concurrently, there is
required a program of public information and discussion on the broadest possible scale. Out of such a process, I am convinced that we will
again exercise our political genius in a manner worthy of our political
heritage.

